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The preceding issue of the Management Quarterly contained an article which 
proposed universal military training (UMT) as an alternative to the all-volunteer 
o force ("The United States National Security Posture: A Proposal , 11 by Frydenlund, 
McCarthy, Robinson and Sheman}. The first three articles in this issue explore 
the other end of the spectrum by considering ways of utilizing our manpower force 
more efficiently. They advocate retaining officers for longer, more productive 
careers, and address some of the present obstacles facing such a plan. In its 
simplest tenns the problem comes down to a choice between recruiting and training 
large numbers of personnel for brief careers (i.e., a high turnover); or reducing 
the turnover rate--and numbers required to be recruited and trained--by increasing 
the length of service from individuals. Although each article addresses a dif- ' 
0 
ferent topic, this common thread of better utilization of our manpower assets 
runs through all of them. 
The final selection chronicles an operations research analysis of a close-
to-home problem. In reviewing past Management Quarterly's we found that rela-
tively few technical papers have been published. This is believed to be partly 
due to the difficulties of getting the graphs, charts, photographs, computer 
print-outs, etc., into print. The selection in this issue was edited by the 
authors to circumvent this problem for us. If you have questions concerning the ~ 
paper (especially those resulting from the editing) the authors will be glad to 




RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION and MN 3109 
by Conmander George L. Stansbury, 
Department of Operations Research 
and Administrative Sciences 
In October 1972, Admiral ZuJTMalt sent Admiral Freeman a message asking 
that each Naval Postgraduate School graduate receive up to twenty hours of 
race relations education prior to departure for his next duty station. To 0 
accomplish this for December 1972 graduates, resources were requested from 
Fort Ord, and a four-hour program was designed and delivered by Army race 
relations facilitators. 
Since that time all U.S. Navy NPS graduates have attended UPWARD sem-
inars. UPWARD is the acronym for Understanding Personal Worth and Racial 
Qignity -- the Navy-wide middle-management seminar for race relations education. 
The UPWARD seminar of twenty hours was put together by knowledgeable 
Naval officers and consultants three years ago. The seminar is conducted by 
majority-minority (white/non-white) teams of two facilitators who have attended 
Racial Awareness Facilitator Training. This training consists of four-week 
courses conducted at Human Resources Management Centers, located in San Diego 
and Newport,· R.I. The objectives of the UPWARD seminar are: Personal aware-
ness; understanding institutional racism; commitment o eliminating institutional 
racism in the Navy and design of a local col11Tland action program. 
These objectives are approached through a variety of learning methods. 
Presentation is based on the philosophy that adults learn best: (1) that which 
they perceive to be useful to them; (2) what they personally experience; and 
(3) through feedback from others. The classroom is arranged with chairs placed 
in a circle. The facilitator functions in a role quite different from that 
normally associated with the "expert" teacher standing at the front of the room. 
The facilitator introduces the ground rules of: participation, openness and 
honesty, dealing in the "here and now," verbal confrontation, and speaking for 
yourself (owning what you say). His role is to develop a climate in which 
participants feel free to express themselves and learn from each other. To 
create this climate the facilitators divide the roles of "task/content" and 
"process." A good deal of time is spent on clarifying, summarizing, and insuring 
accurate interpersonal collillunications. The facilitator's role is new to most 
participants and is counter to the way most of us have spent our years being 
11taught 11 in school. This process has proven especially effective for learning 
a wide variety of topics and is being more widely used in this country each 
year. A variety of terms is used to describe these methods, two of which are: 
experiential learning methods and laboratory learning. One of the basic assump-








experiences. Thus, each participant will learn different things from each 
exercise while most will achieve a large part of the overall course objectives. 
The MN 3109 course has been structured to achieve several objectives. 
The first objective is to meet the Navy's goals of at least 20 hours of race 
relations education for all personnel each year. To meet this goal at NPS 
(taking into account the length of time students are here, the resources 
available for conducting classes and the Navy's CNET raining Program) 
approximately 36 hours of the 3109 course must be spent on race relations. 
The remaining hours (presently 2 hours of lecture and 4 hours of lab per week) 
are divided about equally between alcohol/drug abuse, intercultural relations, 
and organization development. This breakdown closely approximates the time 
allocation in the Human Goals Program being developed fortheoperating forces. 
Race Relations education can be approached on four basic levels: (l) 
personal prejudice and awareness, (2) minority history and culture in the U.S., 
(3) understanding institutional racism, and (4) critical incident handling 
(riots and disorders). The basic philosophy of MN 3109 is to deal with the first 
three levels -- e.g., creation of awareness of personal feelings and attitudes 
of whites and non-whites toward each other; a cultural background, which may 
not be generally known; and an appreciation of how our society's institutions 
handle racial tensions and problems in this country. These efforts are focused 
on the "here and now11 as opposed to an examination of past incidents and situa-
tions. The education an officer receives is designed to help him be aware of 
the causal factors of racial tensions and give him some techniques for dealing 
with these causal factors. 
Fundamental to all Navy race relations education is the preparation of 
persons in positions of leadership to be able to handle the day-to-day problems 
of racial differences in their units before open conflict occurs. The action 
programs for dealing with racial matters must be designed and implemented at 
the command level, and local programs must be designed to meet local needs. 
There is no way to design an action program for Navy-wide use which will be 
equally useful to an ATF in Mayport and a CVA in Subic Bay. The responsibility 
for effective action lies in the commitment of each command to see its own 
problems and deal with them. A co111non example is the white manager's response, 
"I've never seen a racial problem in the Navy.11 And a common on-white's 
answer is, "I know you have never seen the problem, but I have. 11 Although racial 
problems don't exist everywhere it is apparent from recent publicity that they 
do exist in the Navy and that they were not recognized in time. The current 
race relations education efforts are designed to encourage leaders to look for, 
recognize and deal with racial situations in their own commands before they 
become a matter of publicity. 
Many of the basic tenets of race relations are common to drug and alcohol 
abuse, intercultural relations and organization development(team building and 
organization renewal}. MN 3109 deals in personal awareness and local action 
program design for these areas, too. The basic premise is that dealing with 
causal factors based on a personal awareness of self and an ability to recognize 
the local situation is more effective than trying to deal with visible results 
only. For a free society to exist without anarchy it must recognize and solve 
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persistent social problems. The goal of the Navy is to take responsibility 
for its internal problems and satisfy the expectations of personnel who 
experience these problems. In terms of 11problem ownership," all of us are 
faced with t hese problems -- not just non-whites, drug users, and non-producers 
-- therefore, we must al l , from the most senior to t he newest member of each 
command, become genuinely committed to solving these problems whic h dilute 
our strength and ability. 
Additional speci fic information about the Navy's program may be found 
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One of the ills often alluded to in the Navy by both senior and junior 
officers is the existence of large numbers of passed-over officers who are no 
longer doing their jobs but rather seem to be waiting for retirement, secure 
in the knowledge that they will get their twenty years if they can just stay 
alive. What is wrong with our promotion system? How did these seemingly 
worthless officers get to positions of tenure? Or, were these officers once 
effective managers who have somehow lost their interest and motivation? In 
civilian industry, surely there are those who do not make it to the top but 
yet continue productive careers until retirement at age sixty-two. As pointed 
out by the Cordiner Commission: "Even a full military career is a relatively 
brief one, and service personnel, often at the height of their productivity, 
family obligations, and financial commitments, are forced to alter their 
standard of living to the reduced economic level imposed by retirement." jJ_ 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the utilization of officer manpower in 
the Navy to deter:mine if the present promotion system and career patterns 
make optimum use of scarce manpower esources and to examine possible alterna-
tives which might improve the system. 
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Loss of Motivation. The present promotion system appears in some 
respects to have been specifically designed to de-motivate those who were 
not selected for promotion. I have personally known effective lieutenant 
commanders who reverted to almost a vegetable status after being passed over. 
After fifteen years of periodic family separation and long hours of extra 
work--flying a night hop or preparing for an administrative inspection-- • 
they feel that their career is finished and that they might as well devote 
themselves to their families or spend time writing resumes in preparation 
for their upcoming retirement. After all, they have done their part, let 
some of those junior officers with a future take up the load now. Unfortunately, 
those passed-over lieutenant commanders, commanders and captains make up a 
recognizable portion of the active duty force and their lack of effectiveness 
wastes defense dollars that could be better spent elsewhere. Further, these 
officers, by virtue of their seniority, are most often in positions of () 
authority and their lack of action and example have had a detrimental effect 
on Navy operations. It is often these officers whom junior officers complain 
about when they speak of incompetent leadership. 
One cause of this loss of motivation is also apparent in civilian 
organizations . A satire in Life Magazine characterizes an executive whose 
career is studded with poor decisions but who is considered a success because 
he sells himself and moves steadily upward, finally becoming the Secretary 
of Defense./2 The article suggests that the American dream is built around 
moving upwara in "Peter principle" fashion rather than staying in one job and 
becoming an expert. The executive or officer who fails to qualify for promo-
ti on is a II has been 11 and is expected to move aside to a 11 ow room for younger, 
more dynamic men behind him. Another magazine article describes a Mr. Cart-
wright as an outstanding personnel administrator who attempted to create a 
vice-presidency for himself only to have the position given t o another man. 
His reaction was typical of many who have been passed over--even though they 
have attained a secure and responsible position: "But he will probably never 
be Vice-President. And it is from this aspect of the scenario that the 
average management man recoils. Cartwright would be abdicating his ambition 
and there is something unseemly, even unmanly in that. 11/3 Our culture 
places great emphasis on reaching the top and many organizations, including 
the Navy, hold out the promise of almost unlimited promotion and rapid advance-
ment as career incentives. Unfortunately, almost all organizations are 
pyramids with much more room at the bottom than at the top. If an individual 
competes successfully he is given a carrot; e.g., a promotion to the next spot 
on the hierarchal ladder. If he doesn't, he is rapped with t he stick of failure. 
Harry Levinson calls this carrot-and-stick approach asinine . In his words: 
"While the bureaucratic structure, with its heavy emphasis on internal 
competition for power and position, is often touted as a device for 
achievement, it is actually a system for defeat. Fewer people move 
up the pyramidal hierarchy at each step. This leaves a residual 
group of failures, often euphemistically called 'career people,' who 
thereafter are passed over for future promotions because they have 
not succeeded in competition for managerial positions .•• resentful 
and defeated ••• no longer motivated by competitive spirit ..• the 
carrot and stick are meaningless . •• they see little need to learn more 





The Navy promotion system formalizes this process. Of a group of 1000 
ensigns, 923 will make lieutenant (junior grade), 796 will make lieutenant, 
472 will make lieutenant commander, 124 will make captain and only 27 will 
attain flag rank . .L§_ Those projections were made after the Korean police 
action, but appear to closely approximate the promotion percentages we have 
been experiencing since the end of hostilities in Vietnam. They show the 
Navy hierarchal structure to be a very steep pyramid, which in turn results 
in a great number of disappointed officers along the way. Additionally, the 
Navy considers its officers for promot~on in blocks. Once passed over, it is 
very unlikely that an officer will be picked up in subsequent years. As an 
example, of 987 lieutenants selected for promotion in 1972, only fifty-five /6 
had previously been passed over and of 267 lieutenant commanders elected -
for promotion to conmander, only twenty-seven had been previously considered./7 
In each case the percentage is ten percent or less, which, in the case of -
lieutenant commanders, is spread out to cover the three to five year period 
between their first pass over and retirement. Further, an analysis of 
selection lists indicates that only those officers who are working for admirals 
or who are in extremely visible jobs are likely to be picked for promotion 
after once being passed over. This system adds to the trauma of failing to 
be promoted by making it very obvious that there is little chance of being 
promoted thereafter. Also, the fact that a nonselectee 1s name is missing from 
a one-shot list published by naval message also makes the failure very obvious 
to his peers, wife, children and to any future employer. Add to this the fact 
that this officer will soon be retired at half pay--when his fami ly obligations 
are probably at their highest and his civilian contemporary is experiencing 
his greatest earning power--and it can be understood why such officers almost 
always lose the greater part of their career motivation. 
In addition to the obvious factors that may affect an officer's perform-
ance after he has been passed over, there appears to be psychological evidence 
that there are underlying causes associated with 11status congruency--the degree 
to which an individual's job advancements (pay grade) are conmensurate with the 
number of years he has worked, his age and his personal responsibilities and 
corrmitments.11 In a study conducted at the Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric 
Research Unit, San Diego. on enlisted men from three cruisers, a definite 
correlation between the aforementioned "status congruency11 and perceived job 
satisfaction and life stress was established./8 Although the study was conducted 
utilizing enlisted men as subjects, it would appear to be equally applicable to 
officers, particularly when it is considered that the latter group normally 
advances as a block from the time of original commissioning and any deviation 
would be extremely obvious. Further, it was found in another study that 
subjects with greater education experienced greater alienation when a lack of 
opportunity existed./9 Each of these factors point to a fact that many of us 
have already observea, the passed-over naval officer is a very dissatisfied 
individual whose job effectiveness is greatly diminished from what it was 
before he was passed over. 
Retirement. There are those who would say, "retirement is not such a 
bad deal--you can take your half pay and go get any job and make more than 
you.did in the Navy.11 However, the Gates Conmission Report, which studied 
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factors affecting the attainment of an all-volunteer force, indicates that 
retirees do rather poorly, job-wise, after they leave the service . /10 Civilian 
employers do not appear to believe that an unsuccessful military career is a 
selling point for a middle-aged manager trying to break into industry . Besides, 
industry already has its eunuchs, why should they hire more? So the early 
military retiree can often look forward to a job selling insurance or real 
estate or some other equally unrewarding second career . Also, a study for 
the Air Force indicates that while junior officers rate highly having an 
opportunity for advancement, they rate a chance for early retirement as least 
important./11 In detachment interviews junior officers often cite, as t heir 
reason forTeaving the service, the fact that even if moderately successful 
(i.e., promoted through commander), they will be forced out of thei r careers 
at a time when security is most important to them. At the twenty-six year 
point, their children will be in college and their family expenses will be at 
a maximum. However, the greatest loss may be to the Navy, for at the time of 
their retirement, these officers have attained tremendous expertise and in 
these times when officer manpower is becoming increasingly hard to recruit, 
it would appear that the Navy is discarding a valuable human resource. Also, 
as previously mentioned, these men often spend the last couple of years plan-
ning for their next career rather than doing a job for the Navy. 
High Velocity Career. An often-cited rationale for the short time frame 
of a naval career and the attendant high attrition rates is the need for a 
youthful, virile and dynamic force./12 It is argued that younger men are 
needed to face the pressures of the cold war and to fight the battles if open 
conflict should occur. However, Vice Admiral A.E. Jarell, USN (ret . ) points 
out that Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance, Kinkaid, Mitschner and McCain were not 
young men but stood up well to the extreme pressures of World War II. Also, 
he points out that the only officers under his command who made really poor 
decisions at Okinawa, where t he going was really tough, were the young inex-
perienced conmanding officers. Further, the only officer under his command 
who was unable to withstand the pressure to the point that he had to be hospital-
ized was a young lieutenant. His belief is that a military officer need not be 
a genius, but rather must be a "jack of all trades, must never have a one-track 
mind and must enjoy working with people."/13 Admiral Jarrell points to his 
commanding officer on a destroyer; a lieutenant conmander, who finally got 
promoted to conmander in his twentieth year and then went on to become CNO. His 
thesis is that experience and maturity are more important than youth and 
vitality; and suggests that had it not been for the respecte d leadership of 
men like Nimitz and Halsey the war might not have turned out so wel l. The Gates 
Commission also points out that as technology increases, fewer officers will 
actually be in the field, where youth is a requirement, but rather in technical 
billets where experience is paramount. 
On the other han·d, many people now believe that in these times of rapidly 
changing technology and social thought we constantly need new blood to insure 
that we are able to adapt to the times. They assert that ol der off icers are 
set in their cognitive worlds and are unable to accept new ideas and needed 
change. This attitude was expressed by Lieutenant Junior Grade Jonathan T. Howe 




the traditional way of doing things . He feels that any future war will last 
only a very short time and therefore sees cold bridge watches and other 
adversities as holdovers from the past that serve only to drive young 
11intelligent 11officers from the service. He suggests that the Navy should 
emphasize the intellectual and technical aspects of a career rather than some 
of the unpleasant facets which are now prevalent./14 He was answered in a 
later issue by two 11older 11 officers who asserted that time had proven that 
those who can stand up to adversity are the best leaders./15 One of these 
writers suggested that possibly the Navy was not Lieutenant Junior Grade Howe's 
cup of tea and that maybe he had better get out. Probably the answer lies 
somewhere between the two extremes. Certainly we need the experience--and I 
think we lose a lot of it through early retirements and loss of motivation by 
our older officers--but it is also vital that we have new blood with fresh 
ideas and new ways of doing things. 
Another reason often given by proponents for a more youthful force is 
that our older leaders tend to be more authoritarian than our younger ones. 
They point out that while authoritarian leadership may have worked in the 
past, it is no longer effective because our enlisted men are now much better 
educated and are likely to demand that decisions be more reasonable from their 
point of view. It is suggested that participative leadership and leadership 
by objectives is more appropriate, and that the older, more authoritarian · 
officers are unable to adapt to these styles. I have personally seen senior 
officers of both kinds. Certainly some of the most "people-oriented" leaders 
I have seen were Commanding Officers of aircraft carriers I have served on. 
I am of the opinion that most of these 11people-type 11 leaders I have known 
have been on the way up, while most of the authoritarians have been in stagnant 
or pre-retirement jobs. This feeling may have been supported by a study con-
ducted at the United States International University on manager's supervisory 
styles./16 This study evaluated the intrinsic and extrinsic needs of managers. 
It was found that the less satisfied managers were more authoritarian and that 
managers more often cite intrinsic or ego needs as the root of their dissatis-
factions. It is possible then that our more authoritarian leadership styles 
are the result of what we do to our passed-over officers rather than a result 
of chronological age. Admiral Jarrell points out that he has known officers 
of sixty that were more physically fit and capable than others at age forty./17 . 
Certainly it is known that some children mature faster than others and likewise 
some naval officers may develop their career potential later than others. 
Therefore, it seems unreasonable to tie careers to specific age or length-of-
service criteria as we now do. 
Deep Selection. One method of giving outstanding officers a better 
chance to get ahead is a deep selection process whereby an officer is 
selected for the next higher rank before his year group is in the promotion 
zone. The present percentage maximum is fifteen; however most selection 
boards limit deep selections to about ten percent. The deep selection concept 
was first "forced" on the Navy in 1959 by the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Charles 
Thomas. In a letter to the rear admiral selection board Secretary Thomas 
dir~cted that five percent of the selectees be picked ahead of schedule. Such 
officers were to be head and shoulders above their contemporaries. 
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Most of the Navy's admirals objected to the new proceedure, saying you 
can give them the stars, but not the experience. After his retirement as CNO, 
Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN (ret.) espoused the traditional view in an 
article he wrote for the Proceedings./18 He stated that outstanding officers 
who are flag material should be identffied as potential--vice definite. 
Instead of early promotions, these officers should be given particularly 
demanding jobs to '11allow them the chance to stub their toes 11 and to groom 
them for flag rank. He further asserted that 11head and shoulders" officers 
don't come in five percent groups of every graduating class (Naval Academy); 
therefore, the five percent criteria would cause an artificial category to be 
established. He said his experience on selection boards had taught him that in 
each group there is a small percentage of officers who are unquestionably 
superior, a small percent who are not promotable and a large body who could 
do the job if vacancies existed; but that it is unusual to find a superstar. () 
He believed that deep selection was desirable for that individual but that a 
faulty deep selection is particularly bad for group morale. Admiral Carney 
was conmenting on an article on the same subject by Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, 
USN, who was echoing the concerns of many of the senior officers then on 
active duty./19. Admiral Sabin was concerned that deep selectees have never 
really competed with those who they have jumped over. He points out that 
those officers• fitness reports cannot have reflected their performance if the 
responsibility had never been given to them. He agrees that the 11head and 
shoulders" types must be given a chance to stub their toes. Admiral Sabin 
also points out that some early selectees will spend more than twenty-five 
percent of their careers in flag rank. 
The latter concern suggests that officers can stagnate at any rank, not 
just lieutenant cormiander or conmander. In a previously cited article, 
Admiral Jarrell pointed out that as a result of the World War I hump he was 
in his twenty-ninth year when he was promoted to flag rank. A good friend of 
his who was a general in the Airforce was ten years senior to him even though 
Admiral Jarrell had graduated from college four years earlier than the General. 
The General complained of stagnation and that he intended to get out when.his 
thirty years were up because of the lack of career opportunity. This was hard 
for A<iTiiral Jarrell to understand since the world looked good to him and he 
was quite enthusiastic about his own job. 
It appears that one problem with accelerated promotion schemes is that 
they leave the officer no place to go once he reaches relatively high rank. () 
An article in Fortune entitled "The Accelerated Generation Moves Into Manage-
ment11 makes the same assertions for the civilian sector./20 The author points 
out that the rapid promotions required to recruit and retain young executives 
tend to irritate older employees, cause salary compression, and most importantly, 
result in a marked slowdown when the executive reaches the point where higher 
positions are limited. · If he reaches this point at an early age he can become 
very dissatisfied because he perceives that he is losing momentum. In other 
words, how do you follow the act of rapid promotions once the executive reaches 
the top? In an effort to accelerate outstanding line officers the Navy 
recently instituted a new program called 11bobbysoxers.11 Select officers were 
given convnands as lieutenant con111anders ather than as colllllanders. All this 




years of operational flying. These officers presently have no place to go 
since they are too junior for the next upward assignment. A chance for promo-
tion throughout a career may prove to be a more important incentive than rapid 
promotion early in a career. 
· The Hump. The worst periods of rank stagnation occur after each war or 
conflict. In order to fill the requirements for combat, many additional 
officers are brought into the Navy. As a result, promotions are faster and 
pass overs are held to a minimum. After the conflict, when forces are cut 
back, the higher percentage of officers remain in the upper ranks and promotions 
are .reduced to a minimum. Presently, promotions to lieutenant commander are 
being held to about seventy percent as compared to almost ninety-five percent 
during the height of the Vietnam conflict. Additionally, promotions to the 
ranks of lieutenant commander, commander, and captain are being delayed as 
much as two years following selection. The Navy is also asking for additional 
legislation to force early retirement for commanders and captains in order 
to increase promotion opportunity for younger officers. Perhaps the worst 
hump occurred after the Korean conflict. Much of that hump was caused by 
poor planning, but as then-Commander Zumwalt pointed out, the only way we could 
have avoided the hump would have been to keep the Navy too small to properly 
fulfill its mission./21 At that time (1959) over fifty percent of the captains 
on the active duty 11st had been passed over and there were 8000 lieutenant 
commanders and commanders to be fitted into 2000 available captain slots 
during the next few years. Commander Zumwalt implied that there was no 
solution to the problem except to retire many of the passed-over commanders 
and captains early, some of whom seem to have been promoted out of a job. He 
concluded his article with the following consolatory remarks= "Those of us 
who must retire as a result of this action -should be thankful for the part 
we have been able to play to date in the manning of our Navy and should strive 
to see this final sacrifice in the light of the over-all good it will do the 
service.''/22 These words, needless to say, didn't placate many of those who 
were leaving and the Proceedinas was deluged with comments for months to come. 
One captain who had been passe over for admiral was particularly bitter when 
he wrote to Admiral Jarrell./23 He pointed out that an officer whom he had 
reported on had been picked up for admiral over him. This officer had not 
even had a major command whereas the writer had served under several admirals 
and had been recommended for flag rank by five of them. He further pointed 
out that all of his fitness reports except one, right after he had been selected 
for captain, were 4.0. He said he couldn1 t help but feel that the other officer 
was ,selected simply because he was younger. 
In another article Lieutenant Commander John A. Chastain, USN, blamed 
the hump problem on poor fitness reporting./24 He pointed out that during 
the Korean conflict, almost all combat officers were marked "outstanding." 
He asserted that an officer's promotion depended more on what duty he was 
lucky enough to get rather than on his performance and that due to the "up or 
out" policy, many officers were being retired without having been given a fair 
opportunity to make their mark. Both he and Admiral Jarrell pointed out that 
much of the problem could have been avoided if reporting seniors had reported 
objectively so that controlled attrition could have been accomplished. 
11 
Effect on Junior Officers . The primary reason for accelerated promotion 
programs is to attract and retain junior officers; yet more and more of them 
are leaving the service. Admiral Jarrell said, concerning hump legislation, 
that 0 the most disturbing comments that I have heard come from very young 
officers, not from those older officers who must precipitat~yleave the Navy. 
When they see that respected seniors must leave, they think about their own 
prospects. 11 /25 
One study suggests that organizatio nal people, as opposed to research 
and development types, may be more interested in tenure than in rapid promo-
tion./26 Whereas the research scientist is more self-actualized and looks for 
the jobthat will give him the most personal gain, the organizational type 
percei ves that he has passed up other jobs to gain his position in the organiza- () 
tion. Although promotion is important, he may be more interested in a secure 
career in which promotions are less rapid but more assured. Another study con-
ducted at the University of Minnesota Industrial Relations Center indicates 
that naval officers are not necessarily a homogeneous group and may be motivated 
in different ways. In a sample of 271 officers, 41 percent were classified as 
pragmatic, whereas 47 percent were moralistic. The pragmatic group valued 
promotion highly while the moralistic group considered it to be a weak factor . 
The moralistic group had operative values of honesty, responsibility, trust, 
emotional stability and courage. The pragmatic groups operative values were 
judgment, responsibility, initiative, emotional stability, rationality, self-
confidence, self-expression, foresig ht, resoursefulness, ambition, stamina 
and aggressiveness./27 It would appear from this study that a lasting career 
would be more important than rapid advancement for a large portion of the 
officers. However, a second report indicates that both groups rate job security 
and sea duty low while highly valuing promotion, pay, prestige and rank./28. 
In an article entitled "The Credible Incentive/' Captain Golden promotes 
t he belief that "retention of officers swings on the jeweled bearings of 
creditability," and that t hrowing senior officers out on half pay while 
shrinki ng the remaining officers' incentives negates gains resulting from 
greater promotion oppor tunity./29 In one civilian company top management 
11hoped t hat 40-year-olds would respond with unbridl ed enthusiasm when the 
SO-year-olds were cleaned out. " But the younger men failed to respond, 
because they saw that what was happeni ng to the older men would most likely 
be their fate ten years hence./30 
Selection Boards, Lineal Lists and Fitness Reports. Captai n Worth Scauland 
describes the process of a selection board thusly: A board of nine officers 
reviews the records of 3000 officers. Selection is made by vote, and six out 
of nine votes are usua.lly required for selection. Prior to the vote, each . 
record is reviewed by a briefing officer who is a member of the board. He 
fills out a briefing sheet which is based primarily on fitness reports. The 
briefing officer reviews about 30 to 35 records an hour and assigns a grade 
to the officer to go along with the briefing sheet for consideration by the 
entire board. It is pointed out by Captain Scauland that fitness reports are 




Unfortunately, fitness reporting is more of an art than a science. Some 
officer communities within the Navy mark most of their officers outstanding 
while others play it straight and try to mark more objectively. It is somewhat 
possible to tell the kind of marks a particular conrnanding officer gives by 
the distribution numbers along the bottom of each marking column; however, the 
suspicion remains that promotion depends a great deal on where the officer has 
been and who he has worked for, in addition to the marks received. 
Officers are considered for promotion in blocks of lineal numbers. 
Lineal order is assigned upon original conmissioning and is often based on 
academic performance and class standing. Because only limited numbers of 
officers are in the zone at any one time and since high percentages are usually 
selected, nonselection results in a considerable stigma on the officer concerned. 
In Admiral Jarrell I s words: "Joe Bloke wasn I t selected? He must have been in 
some very serious trouble. 11/31 Rear Admiral Duncan, who later became Chief of 
Naval Personnel, points out'"'tnat in most professions the majority of men work 
effectively at a given level for years./32. He further questions the establish-
ment of lineal numbers based on academic perfonnance and suggests that they be 
revised periodically by promotion boards. Captain Needham says a promotion sys-
tem should provide for: distribution of numbers of officers in each grade; a 
flow rate; and for attrition. He further asserts that promotion should not be 
a reward for long and faithful service but should rather be based upon perfonn-
ance./33 However, there is considerable resistance to abolishing or altering 
lineaTTists due to a strong conviction within the Navy that an officer should 
not be required to work for a former classmate or contemporary. It was even 
suggested that officers who were deep-selected should have their lineal number 
readjusted to its original position once the rest of that officer 1s year group 
was promoted. Such a sys.tern where no one individual can really excel• and 
where there is often 95 percent selection through lieutenant co1T111ander1 is 
discouraging to the front runners./34 
Conclusions. There are good reasons why passed-over officers in the 
Navy lose most of their motivation. Our culture holds a strong opinion that 
those who fail to advance are failures. When an officer is passed over, it 
is painfully obvious to everyone, including his family, and he has little or 
no future opportunity for advancement. Only a small percentage of the officers 
selected in a given year are among those who have previously been passed over. 
Those promotions most often go to officers who have been fortunate enough to 
obtain "high visibility 11 billets. Most passed-over officers will go to very 
obscure, nonoperational billets, often in remote locations. Further, the 
passed-over officer will soon be retired, involuntarily, at the prime of his 
earning ability (based on civilian employment). Once retired, the passed-over 
officer has a high probability of getting a relatively uninteresting job on 
the outside, unless he has obtained a saleable skill while in the service. 
It is not surprising, t"hen, that he is less than motivated for the remainder 
of his career. Younger officers perceive that their senior, who is often a 
dedicated and effective officer, has not been treated fairly, and that they are 
likely to receive similar treatment as their fate. Many have cited this reason 
for leaving the service rather than choosing the Navy as a career. The Navy 
ts losing valuable manpower esources through inflexible career policies and 
action should be taken to correct them. 
13 
Recommendations. An officer should have a reasonable chance for promo-
tion right up to the time that he is due to retire. In a previously cited 
article, Commander Day recommended that officers be considered for promotion 
throughout four years./35 He recommended that ten percent be selected the 
first year, twenty-five percent the second, thirty percent the third year and 
twenty-five on the fourth. Under the present system, a number of officers 
close to the cut-off point are considered. On one side of the line the officers 
make it and are continued on a viable career; on the other side the officers 
are passed over with almost no chance of being picked up. Depending on the 
quality of the fitness report system there is a possibility that a considerable 
number of the 11failures 11 are superior to some of the selectees. If promotions 
are spread out, as Commander Day reconmends, officers would be allowed to 
compete for additional years to see which officers really perform the best. 
The added years of consideration would give both officers additional incentive 0 
to continue their highest perfonnance. Additionally, those officers who 
were selected in one of the early groups would receive feedback that their 
efforts were worthwhile. 
Lineal numbers should at least be revised. There is no good reason why 
an officer's seniority should be established forever by his class standing. 
Actually, I would recommend that lineal numbers be abolished altogether. At 
the present time, unit duty assignments are most often made on the basis of 
who is senior rather than who is best suited for the job. If lineal numbers 
were abolished, the job would go to the all-round best man. Given equal 
ability and drive, the most experienced or most senior man would normally get 
the job, but it wouldn't be just because he had the lowest lineal number. 
Officers would immediately know that they are falling behind by the kinds of 
jobs they were assigned to and could adjust their actions accordingly. At any 
rate, nonselection would not come as such a surprise as it presently does in 
some cases. Doing away with lineal numbers would also solve some of the previ-
ously mentioned promotion problems. All individuals of a given rank could 
then be considered for promotion at the same time. Given equal perfonnance you 
would again expect that the most experienced man would get selected; however, 
the outstanding can di date who has only held rank for a short whi 1 e has an 
automatic chance for early selection. There would then be less stigma attached 
to a pass over since many officers being considered would be in the same boat. 
Age would not have to enter into the promotion picture unless it affected 
performance adversely. The officer could simply look to the next year for o 
promotion when his added experience and continued efforts would give him a 
better crack at it. 
Such a plan would require changes in public law to revise the criteria 
for early retirement. However, with the added incentive provided to work for 
eventual promotion.we may find that older officers are too valuable a resource 
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The officer promotion system in the U.S. Navy is not optimal for 
either the Navy or the individual officer. While it appears to work in 
an equitable fashion for the individual by giving each a sequential oppor-
tonity ' for promotion, it is this very idea of sequential or lineal pro-
motion that fails the Navy' by preventing the better-perfonning officer from 
moving more quickly to tne top, and depriving most individual officers of 
any valid feedback on their relative performance. I acknowledge the exis-
tence of those few officers singled out for deep selection as a step in 
the direction of matching rate of advancement to performance, but deep 
selection in the Navy is recognition of gross differences in performance. 
By d~nying recognition of lesser differences in performance, the oppor-
tunity to accelerate "better" officers is lost. 
19 
We have a 11 heard the catch phrase, "Perfonnance is the key to 
promotion11 used to describe the present system. It is no doubt true that 
stellar perfonnance is the key to deep selection, and that some minimum 
performance is required for selection when in the zone. The fact that 
officers are not considered "due" for promotion and cannot improve their 
position on the lineal list until their turn approaches, makes it clear 
that rate of advancement for the majority depends only on quotas dictated 
by the needs of the service, and that performance is used primarily as a 
tie breaker when attrition is required. This system fails to ensure that 
"better" officers are moved more quickly, or even steadily, toward the top. 
It suffers from fluctuating input levels and demands for promotion from year 
to year. At the point of selection for a new rank, it is a definite advantage 
to the prospective selectee to be in a small year-group during a force build· 0 up compared to being in a large year-group during a cut-back. 
Most career officers are never provided any reliable feedback on the 
evaluations of their performance, since so few are singled-out for deep 
selection. Not many are passed over when due for promotion until late in their 
careers; rather, most fall into that single nebulous category spanning the 
perfonnance spectrum from, "almost fit for deep selection," to, "just barely 
promotable. " How does an officer in this category know where he really stands? 
Is he almost good enough for deep selection, or barely promotable? He will 
never learn his relative standing unless he can obtain inside information on 
the proceedings of his selection board. Between selections no meaningful 
infonnation is available. 
If tests administered at the Naval Postgraduate School are valid, the 
typical naval officer rates high in need for achievement./1 Such individuals 
are characterized, in part, by a tendency to set difficult:" but attainable, 
goals for themselves, and a strong desire for concrete, measurable feedback 
of results of their individual efforts./2 By placing all those officers who 
are promoted on time into a single category, an outstanding opportunity for 
timely, pertinent feedback is lost. 
The single factor contributing most to the inadequacy of the present 
promotion system is the unreasoningly high regard for the lineal list of 
officers. Because of this regard, I claim that the promotion system depends 
primarily on seniority, with performance merely used as a qualifier. Most 0 
officers are promoted because their turn has arrived and they have met the 
minimum performance criteria (which varies with demand}. 
Consider the initial ordering of a group of new ensigns on the lineal 
list. We start with that precept of fair play, "first-come, first-served." 
An earlier date of coninissioning rates a higher place on the list, with ties 
for Naval Academy graduates broken by class standing. In other cases, 
alphabetical rankings have been made. Admittedly, a more sophisticated 
system would undoubtedly require huge expenditures of time and money to 
produce significantly better results. Consequently, I do not strongly object 
to-such an initial assignment of officers to the list, but wish to point out 




I do object to the idea that once this arbitrary assignment is made, 
it becomes unlikely that an officer will ever be able to change his position 
relative to his peers. Assume for the moment hat the only individual 
criteria for rate of advancement is perfonnance, andthemeasure of that 
performance is the interpretation of officer fitness reports by promotion 
selection boards. If this were the case, we would expect that after a few 
promotions of a group of officers, the relative positions on the list would 
be rearranged. It would be very surprising, under such a system, to find that 
the relative standings of a group of conmanders had not changed since they 
were ensigns. Such a situation would imply either: (l) the original arrange-
ment was made with some remarkable knowledge of the future perfonnance of the 
officers, or (2) perfonnance was not the real key to rate of advancement. If 
we look at the real world, we see this same situation being perpetuated by 
the results of every selection board. If we examine an arbitrary group of 
officers who have never been passed over or selected early, we see that the 
relative positions of these officers {to others in the group) has never changed. 
Rare cases of disciplinary repositioning of individuals on the list are the 
only exceptions to this rule. Officers with the same early selection pattern 
and timing also maintain relative position. Since I cannot believe that 
original precedence arrangements of new officers are made with any divine fore-
sight, I must conclude that perfonnance is not the key to rate of advancement. 
It is easy to see why a belief develops among some officers that promotion 
results from getting the right boxes marked and keeping a low profile until 
it's your turn. Perhaps some even hold the view that deep selectees are 
11rate-busters. 11 
Each selection board produces a list of selectees for promotion who fall 
into three categories: those not selected by earlier boards, but deemed 
promotable by the current board; those selected from the zone who were "due" 
for promotion; and those stellar performers who were good enough to be selected 
early (up to two years before their "turn" arrived). When promotions of the 
selectees corrmence, the sacred lineal list prevails. The officer who gets 
promoted first is not the best performer of the whole list--not one of the 
superstars whose perfonnance has literally demanded attention and early 
selection--but rather, the first promotion goes to the slower developer who 
has been passed over by one or more previous selection boards. From a charitable 
point-of-view, this seems like a nice thing to do, but it is not a process 
which tends to accelerate movement of the best perfonners to the top. To be 
selected early, an officer has to demonstrate significantly better perfonnance 
than his peers, but in recognition of this perfonnance he ends up at the bottom 
of the list of new selectees. In an extreme case where the first officer below 
the zone is deep selected, he will be promoted near the end of the fiscal year 
with only a small gain in date of rank and no gain .in lineal number over the 
next junior officer promoted "on time. 11 Obviously there is a potential future 
benefit from deep selection, but it is contingent on continued stellar perfonnance. 
Strict adherence to the idea of a fixed lineal list generates the rank 
inversion problem that tends to deny the experience of passed-over officers to 
operational commands. Under the present system, a passed-over officer is, and 
always will be, senior to every other officer of his rank who has not been 
passed over. Even though they may be lacking in some areas, many could provide 
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valuable depth of experience in an operational environment. They are seldom 
so assigned because their seniority would force other more promising juniors 
out of important experience billets in the conmand. 
The concept of the officer structure of the Navy as a pyramid with the 
attendant, 11 up or out, 11 policy of promotion forces acceptance of the notion 
that if an officer is not fit for promotion on schedule, he will likely never 
be fit and therefore the best alternative is forced attrition. In studies 
connected with the Glacier Project, Elliot Jaques has surmised that the 
capacity for responsibility in individuals is characterized by various rates 
of development with maximum potential capacity related to age and a (correctly 
identified) current capacity./3 Maximum rate of growth is seen in the earlier 
years. Although the rate of growth drops with age, growth continues through-
out the working years of all but the lowest capacity-level individuals. To 
force an officer up or out at some arbitrary point is to deny that individuals 
develop at different rates. An officer destined to rise to CNO undoubtedly 
shows some superiority in performance early in his career. On the other hand, 
why must an officer twice passed over be considered of no further value to the 
service? How many new officers must be recruited to replace those forcibly 
attrited? What assurance exists that they will be better, or even as good? 
What is the value of experience lost by discarding the slow developer? These 
questions must be weighed in the environment of rising recruiting and training 
costs. 
What would happen in a large corporation if management personnel were 
grouped by the year in which employment conmenced, periodically considered 
for promotion in those groups, and either promoted or given a "black mark11, 
with anyone receiving two consecutive "black marks" fired without further 
recourse? I predict that junior managers would be discouraged from working 
under such a policy, particularly if no feedback were available to indicate 
evaluations of performance in the periods between reviews. 
0 
Can the Navy get the maximum return from its investment by demanding 
school-like progress from the officer corps? Its new officers come from 
diverse backgrounds throughout the United States, with educational levels 
varying from (occasionally) less than a high school diploma to multiple 
advanced degrees. They possess a certain minimum (as measured) intellect, 
with ages ranging from the early twenties to the thirties; and immeasurable 0 
differences in goals, personal maturity and attitude toward the service. 
They are grouped by the calendar, given training varying from a minimum of 
indoctrination to the acquirement of a naval specialty, and sent to serve 
in all the differing units of the Navy. Finally, they are rated periodically 
on a scale without definable (at the local level) units, and then considered 
11due11 for promotion in· groups defined by narrow time slices across the order 
in which they conmenced their service. Performance is supposed to be the 
criteria for advan·cement, but unless an officer is a superstar, or doesn1 t 
meet the minimum requirements for promotion, he will be selected with his 
contemporaries and promoted in lineal order as vacancies occur. 
In an atmosphere of spiraling personnel costs, reductions in force, and 




return for each dollar spent on recruiting and training. Can we afford to 
create dissatisfaction by stifling incentive, or perhaps forcing officers 
into patterns of responsibility in which they are uncomfortable? Jaques 
holds that dissa_tisfaction results from promoting either too fast or too 
slow./4 Since individuals with a high need for achievement characteristically 
set difficult but achievable goals for themselves, it follows that maximum 
benefit for both the Navy and the individual officer would derive from an 
atmosphere wherein each officer could accurately assess his own potential 
relative to the possible goals, and receive adequate feedback to guage his 
progress toward his own goal. I maintain that every ensign does not aspire 
to become the Chief of Naval Operations. McClelland insists that individuals 
high in need for achievement set realistic goals for themselves and crave 
concrete, measurable feedback on their perfonnance.L§_ In order to provide 
such feedback on individual performance, the promotion system could be changed 
to one wherein rate of advancement actually depends on performance. There 
should ultimately be a system that allows as many different rates of advance-
ment as there are evaluations of perfonnance. Each officer should advance 
at a rate commensurate with his own perfom1ance and the needs of the service. 
Relative change could be in either a positive or negative direction to indicate 
the full spectrum of possible performance. A rate reflecting individual 
performance would remove the strong delineation that presently exists between 
early selectees, on-time selectees, and passed-over officers. It would remove 
the present minimum time restrictions and allow truly great performers to 
advance in record time. It would eliminate the category of passed-over 
officers, and, consequently, wipe out the rank inversion problem that prevents 
detailing these officers to operational conrnands. 
Before I make too many great promises for a revised promotion system, 
I shall volunteer some ideas for changing the present system to one which I 
believe would provide increased benefits to both the service and the individual 
officer. Following my proposal, I will attempt to estimate effects on the Navy 
and individual officers. 
The idea of a promotion system which could yield individually tailored 
advancement matched to perfonnance sounds complex and idealistic, yet it 
could be done rather simply. Under the current selection system, promotions 
are made from selection lists in lineal order . Although selection board 
proceedings are not released, it is known from various accounts of typical 
board procedure that boards express varying degrees of confidence in officers 
selected for promotion. To be blunt, the boards do not find all those selected 
to be equal. It would be a simple step, but a just reward for perfonnance, to 
rank and promote officers in the order of preference expressed by the board. 
It would follow ·that selection boards express varying degrees of con-
fidence in those officers not selected for promotion. Their relative perfonn-
ance could also be recognized by reordering of lineal positions without a 
change of grade (promotion). This would provide each officer positive feed-
back concerning the selection board1s evaluation of his performance. 
Since it is desirable to ensure rapid progress for top perfonners, 
and frequeht, concrete, measurable feedback to all officers, the elimination 
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of promotion zones would provide a larger pool of officers of any particular 
rank from which to select those desired for promotion. Annual selection boards 
could then provide an annual feedback to every officer concerning his performance. 
In sum, my proposals are: 
1. Eliminate promotion zones and thus make every officer eligible for 
annual consideration by a selection board. 
2. Promote those selected in order of preference of the selection 
board, and reposition those not selected on the lineal list in order 
of the preference of the board. 
In my opinion, the benefits of such change would be numerous, and 
outweigh adverse effects. 
First, the Navy would realize a gain because the path to the top ranks 
and positions of responsibility would be restricted only by the ability of the 
individual officer. An annual report of selection board evaluation of the 
relative performance of each officer would provide the concrete, measurable 
feedback so much sought after by individuals with a high need for achievement. 
Annual restructuring of the lineal list would tell each officer exactly how 
he rated in relation to his peers. After a few years of service, an individual 
could project with some confidence how high his efforts could take him in the 
Navy. There would be a real basis for setting personal goals. The individual 
officer could easily compare his annual movement oward the top of the list of 
officers of his grade. It would be a simple matter to see if progress was 
faster or slower than the norm. This is concrete, measurable feedback. For 
example, if in a particular year, five hundred lieutenants were promoted and 
one of those not promoted moved more than five hundred names closer to the top 
of the new lieutenant list, he would have a positive indication that he was 
moving up faster than the average. In similar fashion, any officer could 
measure his own progress. Annual incremental restructuring of the lineal list 
would provide an infinite number of possible advancement rates. There would 
be a much better chance of matching rate of advancement to the growth of 
capacity of each officer. Officers who would currently receive normal promo-
tion, but display somewhat above average performance would know that they were 
officially above average and likely be encouraged to increase their efforts. 
Below average performers would also receive timely notification of the results 
of their efforts. An officer who could, early in his career, project that he 
would not rise higher than a particular rank, could have time to test the 
results of increased effort and then if he chose, opt to leave the Navy volun-
tarily at a time of his own choosing. Forced attrition could possibly become 
a thing of the past. 
The status of "passed over" would practically cease to exist. If we 
assume that being passed over is a result of inadequate demonstrated perform-
ance under the current promotion system, it would follow that under the 
proposed system, such officers would never get near the top of the seniority 








slow, g1v1ng the Navy longer, more economical service in return for its 
investment, and also allowing more time for the individual to gain experience 
and knowledge and grow in capacity. When the slow individual reached the 
peak of his development, his performance would simply keep him from ever reach-
ing the top of the seniority list in his then current rank, thus avoiding the 
problems of the "Peter Principle." Since attrition by default would disappear 
along with the category of passed-over officers, selection boards should 
continue to be charged with identification of any officers whose performance 
warranted being 11fired 11 from the Navy. 
While it seems that the burden of the promotion selection boards would 
be greatly increased, I don't feel this would be the case. The initial reviews 
of large numbers of new officers would be undeniably time consuming, but the 
cumulative effects of successive reviews would enable development of some 
method of characterizing individual potential. As time passed, selection 
boards for senior ranks might only have to confirm the standings generated by 
previous boards. Individual officers would benefit because overall progress 
would be affected less by variances in particular selection boards. Ultimately 
selection boards could meet and return their findings without even being provided 
with quotas to fill. The output of a board would be a list of all officers of 
. a grade starting with the board's first choice for promotion ranging in order 
down to the last choice, plus the names of any officers to be separated. Pro-
motion of the required number could then be made from the top of this list. In 
the event of a rapid increase in force size, temporary promotions could be made 
from the remaining list with some confidence that the next selection board would 
confirm most of them. Force reductions could be made by selectively cutting 
officers whose progress had stagnated (i.e., starting at the bottom and working 
upward). There would no longer be the problem of varying opportunity caused 
by big zone/small quota and small zone/big quota situations. Outstanding per-
formers could gain requisite experience and move into top-level management 
positions in less time. Where necessary, tour lengths could be adjusted to 
give more or less experience as deemed necessary based on projected future 
potential. Longer, lower rank service from slower developers would reduce 
personnel costs without shattering morale. In the Navy today, there are 1,500 
lieutenant conmanders who have been passed over one or more times for conmander. 
Most will never make conmander. With retirement assured, nearly all will serve 
up to 40 per cent of a twenty-year career as passed-over lieutenant conmanders. 
Since these officers are presumably those with lower demonstrated performance, 
the costs to the Navy would have been much less if they could have progressed 
more slowly to their ultimate rank. Few were passed over for lower grades; 
rather, they were in the pack, being promoted on time until they were passed 
over for commander. Some might have been better prepared if given more time 
to develop. Others mig~t never develop sufficiently to warrant selection, but 
in either case it would benefit the Navy to cause them to serve a greater por-
tion of their careers at less pay. There is a possibility that, given an 
early prediction of ·never going beyond lieutenant conrnander, none would remain, 
but I consider that unlikely. At worst, that would mean voluntary attrition of 
slow developers, and that's not all bad. 
One of the most profound effects possible would be the complete debunking 
of every myth or sea story that presently exists concerning the advantages or 
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disadvantages of particular types or locations of duty. After a few years of 
operation, sufficient empirical evidence should accrue to prove or disprove 
such tales. 
The Navy has recognized the need for feedback by requiring junior 
officers to view their fitness reports and be counseled on their perfonnance. 
This is a commendable action but one which contains too many variables to be 
of maximum benefit. While a conmanding officer may attempt to convey to one 
of his officers what his fitness report really means, it is not certain that 
selection boards will have the same assessment. The situation is further 
confused by the junior officer's own perception of the validity of his com-
manding off i cer's opinion. Annual feedback from the selection board might 
open the eyes of both the subject and the writer of the fitness report. 
A problem linked with my proposals is that of correlating rank from 
one service to another with a different promotion system. It is possible 
that this could be worked out by annually reassigning constructive dates of 
rank. It is also possible that legal requirements would not allow promoting 
out of lineal order, or even adopting such a system on a unilateral service 
basis. I will close by declining to speculate on the degree of legal entangle-
ment involved in any attempt ' to modify the existing system. 
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"THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN OLD, BOLD PILOT; ONLY OLD PILOTS AND BOLD PILOTS" 
-- common twentieth century aviation maxim 
Introduction 
The word aging, particularly as it applies to a specific task set, is 
an extremely relative tenn. An olympic swimmer is usually too old to compete 
effectively by the time he reaches twenty years of age. Most professional 
athletes are getting too old for effective participation by the time they 
reach their fourth decade (George Blanda excluded) and the same seems to apply 
to managers and executives,judging from contemporary hiring practices. ConverseJy, 
it is not at all uncolflllOn for forty-five year old astronauts to perfonn the 
physically and mentally demanding missions into the unknowns of space, nor is 
it in the least unc01111lOn for new giant passenger aircraft, with hundreds of 
passengers' lives in the balance, to be entrusted to airline captains in their 
late fifties. 
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Consider two widely-held opinions concerning aviation: One states 
that combat pilots should be of very young age, since only the younger pilots 
have the necessary aggressiveness to carry out combat operations. This view 
is manifest in the policies of the Israeli Air Force where successful combat 
pilots are precluded from combat missions after age 30. Another widely-held 
opinion, contradictory to the previous one, is that a truly proficient pilot 
needs very comprehensive flying experience, and thusly, he must of necessity 
be older. 
Which of these opinions is valid--or are they both? With the wide range 
of aircraft types and mission profiles {and subsequently wide variety of pilot 
requirements and stresses) perhaps there is room for both to be true. 
In considering these opinions and the effects of change with age on 
pilot performance in general, several questions arise, such as: What decre-
ments in performance are attributable to physiological factors dependent on 
age; does learning rate affect performance; how do psychological factors and 
mental stress reactions vary with increasing age; how does the individual 
pilot's perception of the aging process affect his actual performance; and, 
is the term aging actually attributable to chronological time passage or is it 
a much more complex process involving much more than mere passage of time? 
In any answer to the above questions one must also ask: On what are the answers 
based? Have there been sufficient studies from which to draw answers? Are 
these studies broad enough to cover the subject and are they of sufficient length 
to be longitudinally significant? And, it must be asked of any study purporting 
to draw any conclusion about pilot reaction: Were the studies conducted in a 
controlled laboratory environment or were they deduced from in situ information? 
On this answer rest~ the validity of the entire study, for oiiTytnen can the 
psychological stress of flight be incorporated with whatever other reaction, 
reflex, or response being tested for, whether it be mental or physical. 
In discussing a similar topic, the Navy's increasing use of flight 
simulators vice actual flight for training purposes, a fellow Navy pilot and 
I recently came to the conclusion that the way to make these simulators as 
realistic as possible was figure out the mean time between fatalities in the 
particular type aircraft being simulated, and then program a hammer to swing 
into the pilot's face, smashing it, wi th the mean time between swings matching 
the mean time between fatalities in the actual aircraft. Only then could the 
element of uncertainty, with its absolute results, play a part in trainee reac-
tions . This, of course, was said in jest, but it does very vividly point up 
the great fallacy in comparing laboratory tests to reactions in a live world 
situation. Every pilot knows that there are no deaths nor serious accidents 
attributable to pilot errors resulting from mishaps in flight simulators. 
Regardless of how intently he may try to play his part, this will not be 
forgotten. 
Having dis.cussed the differentes between in situ and controlled labora-
tory studies as they relat e to flying evaluation, an exploration into the 
aging process as it relates to the air crew will be attempted. 
This exploration will take the form of analyzing the various tasks of 
flying, discussing some of the results of recent studies which might be applic-






will be enlightening. but the reader must be forewarned that the conclusions 
of an earlier researcher are still valid: 11All the psychophysiological re-
search on aging actually does not allow any consequences to be drawn with 
respect to limitations of assignment or even eliminations of physically 
healthy pi 1 ots. u- f.l 
Pilot Functions 
Before one can attempt any research into the effects of age on pilot 
reaction. whether approached from the physiological or psychological aspect, 
one must first have some idea as to what a pilot's functions are. As men-
tioned in the introduction these functions vary widely according to air-
craft and mission type. All, to varying degrees, contain some or all of the 
following basic functions: 
1. Attitude, altitude and directional control 
2. Navigation and target identification 
3. Monitoring and adjustment of aircraft systems. such as hydraulic, 
electrical. weapons, sensors~ and conditions of auxiliary equip-
ment such as gear, flaps, deicers, etc. 
4. Inter- and intra-aircraft c01T111unication and cooperation. 
These functions require vigilance, concentration, perception, differ-
entiation, identification. processing, storage and retrieval. Frequently 
they require speedy decisions and equally speedy transfer of these decisions 
into control actions, manipulations or some other activity.L.,g_ Thus, functions 
required of the pilot are watch-keeping, sensory-perceptual, intellectual-motor, 
perceptual-motor, and infonnation sorting and storing functions. With increased 
automation, watchkeeping becomes more and more important. 
Aging Effects on Pilot Performance, Physical Abilities 
One of the philosophies most ardently ingrained in a naval aviator is 
that he must keep physically fit so that he may better react to the stresses 
intrinsic to aviation. The logical corrolary is that as he grows older his 
physical fitness, and thus ability to withstand stress, decrease. Wegman 
and Klein's NATO study refute the basic premise in this argument--that physical 
fitness (as it is used by the military to mean athletic fitness) increases 
stress tolerances. In a controlled study pitting trained atheletes against 
untrain~d men, they tested for reaction to hypoxia. acceleration (G forces) 
exercises, and orthostatic stress. The tests were perfonned at several altitudes. 
They found that the differences in physical abilities decreased with increasing 
stress, suggesting that over-training beyond that necessary to meet requirements 
is not necessary. They concluded: 11A better physical fitness does not imply 
higher tolerance to stresses other than exercise. There is no indication which 
supports the idea .of an improvement of human tolerance to environmental extremes 
by physical exercise training." /3 If the basic premise is destroyed, then 
apparently so is the corrolary. 1f it is not necessary to be athletically 
trained to withstand stress, then decrements in athletic ability with age should 
present no problem. 
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The previously-cited authors did mention that physical exercise did 
increase tolerance to the stressor, exercise. What of this as one gets 
older? What is the physical work load of flying? Evidence from many studies 
measuring the energy requirements required to fly an aircraft are in exist-
ence. For example, a study conducted in World War II showed that caloric cost 
of flying was about 120 kcal/hr. or only about 20% to 30% above the normal 
seated levels. This study also found that the energy costs in all flying con-
ditions, that is, traffic pattern, night, turbulent weather, etc., was 15% to 
20% higher for novice pilots than experienced hands. A 1969 study confirmed 
these studies as they apply to modern aircraft./4 This caloric expenditure of 
about 120 calories/hr. is well within the rangeof a 65 year-old man in fair 
condition. In these generalities about condition or lack of it, it is assumed 
that the reader recognizes that any condition must include agility enough to 
get into and out of the aircraft, and dimensions trim enough to permit the 
subject to fit into the cockpit. Judging from these two mentioned studies, 
the purely physical aspect of aging should not preclude flying until a very 
late age (actual ailments not withstanding). Tyler's conclusions concerning 
age differences in special physical abilities leads to a concurr ing conclu-
sion ./5 
There are two other physical-condition aspects that are important but 
which are usually left out of studies. The first is the effect of physical 
condition on survivability should the pilot and his machine cease to operate 
together for some reason. Physical agility, strength and endurance cannot be 
denied importance in the likelihood of survival in a crash, ditching, bailout 
or ejection. This introduces the second neglected factor, e.g., the mental 
aspects of confidence and well-being brought on by good physical condition. 
Past emphasis on physical condition has led the pilot to believe that he can 
do a better job if he is fit. Thus when fit, he feels more capable and has 
more confidence in his ability to survive. 
The so-called 11Thousand Aviator" study of the U.S. Navy, conmenced in 
1940, is the only timely longitudinal study of individual aviators and is now 
in its thirty-third year. Unfortunately, this study has been concerned almost 
exclusively with defining physical standards and studying heart and blood 
pressure relations, and does not address the quality of performance with time 
nor the psychological aspects of performance. Thus far, the major conclusion 
of the study has been that physical standards have been too stringent./6 
Learning and Learned Tasks 
In a previous paper on learning change with age, the conclusion was 
drawn that there is very little decrement in learning ability with age prior to 
the onset of senility or physical impairment, provided the proper motivation 
was present./7 Further, it was found that learned experiences of a similar 
nature reinforce learning of a new task. Cited also were results of studies 
which concluded virtually no decrements in perceptual or vigilance tasks with 
age (up to the same limitations previously mentioned). 
' A study of airline pilots transitioning to newer aircraft found that 




new equipment (a negative-transfer phenomenon).fl!. However, this study did 
not take into account previous educatton in the basics of the more complex 
equipment nor some of the moti"vati'onal factors involved, and did not deal 
directly with learning abtltty. Otners,such as Tyler, reach opposite conclu-
sions. There is no conclusive answer, but it seems sound to postulate that 
there is not a sufficient decrement in the learning abi 1 ity of an "over 4011 
pilot to preclude him being able to learn a new aircraft. This assumption 
does not presuppose or stipulate any conclusions about his ability to apply 
this learning in such a way as to be as effective a pilot as a younger 
co un te rpa rt. 
Perfonnance, Reaction Time, and Stress 
O If a qualitative difference in performance does take place as a pilot 
ages, it must produce differences in reaction time or differences in reac-
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tion while under stress--particularly psychological stress--or a combination 
thereof. 
The study by Lukyanov and Frolous of stress and the human operator 
has explored the reactions to physical and emotional stress, both qualitatively 
and temporarily. They have reported the physiological reactions to both types 
of stress. Their subjects range from laboratory subjects to cosmonauts 
engaged in space walks. Though they made no attempts at any correlation of 
reaction with age, they did make a statement concerning space flight, which 
I think is applicable to any flight: 111n actual flight, the emotional stress 
predominates, ..• against the background of comparatively low physical effort. 11/9 
Tyler's conclusions concerning motor abilities and performance do indicate 
a decrement with age, but fail to remark on the amount of decrement./10 Miles 
indicated a 10% decrement in this area in the 5th decade,fil -
As for reactions to emotional stress, they are highly individual. 
Lazarus, one of the foremost researchers in the area, states, "stress reac-
tion patterns to the same stress situations vary greatly from individual to 
individual; patterns of reaction are undoubtedly detennined by character-
istics of personality, but little attention has been given to the personality, 
determinants of coping. 11/12 Due to the individuality of the nature of stress 
reaction, any latitudinaTTtudy of stress reaction with age would probably 
be meaningless except in very broad tenns. There are studies of changing 
personalities with age, but these deal with people in what is normally "old 
age11 ,in their mid sixties or older, certainly beyond the age being considered 
in this paper. 
Psychiatric studies have shown that there are tendencies toward higher 
dominance, more anxiety, more intolerance and conservatism as persons age, 
but they report also that the deviations are certainly too great to consider 
the results to be predictive./13 Such studies generally were of psychiatric 
patients and, thus, the generalities of the statements are compounded further. 
L If we are to obtain any meaningful conclusions concerning psychological 
stress reaction variance with age, we must make longitudinal studies of pilots' 
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stress reactions, following a cross section of individual aviators for several 
years. Even periodic questtonnai res concerning attitudes toward various 
situations would be of considerable help. No such study conducted with pilots 
or any similar group seems to be available at this time. Most of the opinions 
that exist, such as: Younger pilots are more aggressive; younger pilots are 
not bothered by night traps (night carrier landings) as much as older ones; 
the kids are the hot shots; there are no old, bold pilots, only old pilots 
and bold pilots; etc.; are just that--opinions. Where these opinions stenmed 
from is another tale altogether. There are probably some facts to back up 
each, but there is certainly ample counter-evidence as well. There is no 
evidence yet available to indicate that younger POWs in Vietnam held up any 
better under mental and physical stress than did the older ones. If press 
accounts can be believed, certainly there were few more aggressive and daring 
fighter pilots than Gen. Robin Olds.who was no spring chicken at the time of () 
his exploits. The percentage of decorations for bravery awarded pilots 
matches their percentage age distribution for those who were allowed to fly 
combat missions. (These latter two examples are certainly open to counter 
discussion.) 
The conclusion is that there are no hard facts available to make valid 
judgments as to age-related react i on to mental stress in well-trained aviators. 
Sunrnary 
The act of piloting an aircraft involves watchkeeping, sensory-perceptual, 
intellectual-motor, pure motor, and reflex-motor functions. Of these only 
sensory functions can be shown to decrease with age in any appreciable degree. 
Little evidence exists to determine what relation the interaction of 
physical or mental stress has on modifying pilot action in a real world 
environment. Few lateral studies and no longitudinal studies correlating 
age with reaction were discovered. 
Conclusions 
As with almost any proposed task in our society based on materialism, 
there must be some financial advantage in evidence to justify expenditure for 
any type of study. The sooner a gain can be realized, the more likely is the 0 
expenditure. Several of the writers on the subject of pilot functioning in 
relation to advancing age expressed a desire to pursue such a course and 
stated paucity of funds as the reason for being unable to follow through. In 
an increasingly economy-minded state, there is a definite need for such studies. 
The amount of money invested in the training of a military pilot is substantial. 
The tendency toward removing him from active flying in fifteen or less years of 
flying--usually by his fortieth birthday--is wasteful of manpower, time, and 
money. If it can be shown that this period can be prolonged,substantial sav-
ings could be realized. 
. An attempt to determine when a pilot is too old to be effective could 
be accomplished by a two-pronged attack. One tack must be to determine what 
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the real requirements for an effective pilot are for each of the facets of 
military aviation. This could be conducted by cross-sectioned studies; 
longitudinal studies would not be necessary. 
The other tack would be to detennine criteria for establishing a 
"behavior age" or "perfonnance age" which could be determined by observa-
tions (physical and psychological) in the live environment. This behavior 
age would naturally vary with each individual and certainly not be based 
on chronology alone, as is now the practice. Lateral and longitudinal studies 
are called for to establish this criteria. 
~ By establishing these two sets of criteria a more realistic approach 
could be made to making a rational detennination of when a pilot is really 
"too old" to be an operational pilot. 
35" 
FOOTNOTES t • t I n .. 
.ll J, Szafran, "Psychological Studies of Aging in Pilots, 11 Aerospace 
Medicine, Vol. 5, 1969. 
11.. H. J. Grunhofer, Col. GAF ,and H. Gerbert, 11Psychophysiological 
Processes of Aging, 11 Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 1970.* 
. ll. H. M. Wegmann, and K. E. Klein, "Physical Training Status in Rela-
tion to Stress Tolerances," Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 1970.* 
/4 D. E. Littel, 11Energy Cost in Piloting Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing 
Aircraft," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 26, 1969. 
/5 Leona E. Tyler, The Psychology of Human Differences (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965). 
/6 R. E. Mitchell and others, "The Thousand Avi ators--A Thirty Year 
Follow:Up, 11 Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 1970.* 
/7 S. E. Wheeler, "Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks" (Unpublished Paper, 
Augustl973). 
/8 F. S. Preston, 11Twelve-Year Study of Airline Pilots, 11 Aerospace 
Medicine, Vol. 3, 1968. 
/9 A. N. Lukyanov and M. V. Frolov, Signals of Human Operator State 
(Moscow: Navka Press, 1969, NASA translation, 1970). 
/10 Tyler, loc. cit. 
/11 W.R . Miles, "Psychological Aspects of Aging, 11 Problems of Aging 
(Secoricredition; Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1948). 
/12 Richard S. Lazarus, and Edward M. Opton, Jr., "The Study of Psy-
chologi'cal Stress," Anxiety and Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1966). 
/13 Tyler, loc. cit. 
*AGARD: Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Conference No. 81, conducted in September 1970, 







Appley, Mortimer H., and Richard Trumbull. Psychological Stress. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965. 
Barrett, Albert M. People Under Pressure. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960 .
Cassie, A. 11Assessment of Flying Skill , 11 Aviation Psychology. Hague: 
Mouton and Co., 1964. 
Fitts, Paul M., and Michael I. Posner. Human Performance. Belmont, Calif.: 
Brooks/Co 1e, 1967. 
Funkenstein, Daniel H., Stanley H. King, and Margaret E. Drolette. Mastery 
of Stress. Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1957. 
Funkenstein, Daniel IL "The Physiology of Fear, 11 Psychobiolo~G Readings from 
Scientific American. San Francisco: Freeman and Co., 6. 
Golanan, Ralph F. "Physical Fitness, Flight Requirements and Age,11 Agard 
Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 1970.* 
Grinker, Roy R., Sr. "The Psychosomatic Aspects of Anxiety," Anxiety and 
Behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1966. 
Grunhofer, H.J., Col. GAF, and H. Gerbert. "Psychophysiological Processes of 
Aging,11 Agard Conference Proceedings, No. Bl, 1970.* 
Kirchoff, H. W. "Phys i ca 1 Activity and Aging, 11 Agard Conference Proceedings, 
No. 81, 1970. * 
Koch, Alfred. 11Physical Fitness and Flying, 11 Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 
1970.* 
Lazarus, Richard S., and Edward M. Opton,Jr. "The Study of Psychological Stress, 11 
Anxiety and Behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1966. 
Levi, Lennart (ed.}. "Emotional Stress, 11 Proceedin s of an International Sm o-
0 sium for Applied Medical Defense Researc . 
Vol. 3, Suppl. 2, 1967. 
• 
Levine, A.S. 11Psychological Stress in World War II German Submarine Service," 
Polaris Personnel Research Memorandum. FBM-7. SUPERS Personnel 
Research Division, 1958. 
Littel, D.E. "Energy Cost in Piloting Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing Aircraft," 
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 26, 1969. 
Lukyanov, A.N., and M.V. Frolov. Signals of Human Operator State. Moscow: 
Nauka Press, 1969, NASA Translation, 1970. 
37 
Mandler, George, and David L. Watson. 
Behavior," Anxiety and Behavior. 
"Anxiety and the Interruption of 
New York: Academic Press, 1966. 
Miles, W.R. "Psychological Aspects of Aging, 11 Problems of Aging. Baltimore, 
1942. 
Mit chell, R.E., and others. 11The Thousand Aviators--A Thirty Year Follow-Up," 
Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 1970.* 
Pressey, Sidney L., and Raymond G. Kuhlen. Psychological Development Through 
the Life Span. New York: Harper and Row, 1957, 
Preston, F.S. 11Twelve Year Study of Airli ne Pilots," Aerospace Medicine, Vol. 
0 3, 1968. 
Seifert, Rudiger. 11Psychological Correlations of Hypoxia-Stress Tolerance, 11 
Aviation Psychology. Hague: Moulton and Co., 1964. 
Selye, Hans. Stress. Montreal : Alta Inc., 1950. 
Selye, Hans. The Stress of Life. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. 
Stevenson, W.J.D. "Morbidity of Aircrew in the Canadian Forces in Relation 
to Age, 11 Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81 , 1970. * 
Szafran, J. "Psychological Studies of Aging in Pilots," Aerospace Medicine, 
Vo 1 . 5, 1969. 
Tyler, Leona E. The Ps~chology of Human Differences. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1 65. 
Wachter, M. "Some Studies of Flying Proficiency," Aviation Psychology. 
Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964. 
~Jegmann, H.M., and K.E. Klein. "Physical Training Status in Relation to 
Stress Tolerances," Agard Conference Proceedings, No. 81, 1970. * 
Wentz, A.E. "Studies on Aviation Personnel Aging," Aerospace Medicine, 
Vol. 6, 1968. 
Wheeler, S.E. "Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks." Unpublished Paper, Aug. 1973. 
*AGARD: Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization . Conference No. 81, conducted in September 1970, 









OF THE UTILIZATION 
OF SAILBOATS 
by M. H. Song 
A. W. Sw-i.ngeJt. 
and 
V. R. E. Hale. 
WhU.e Me.64Jt.6. Quade, Bouchu, e:t at. pondVL 41.Lc.h wughty 
ptLoblem.6 a6 m<.64.Ue 001t.e.e 1tequi.Jz.emenlX, e:tc.., oUJt authoJr.4 tuJr.n 
thwr. .t.a..e.e.n:t& to a. p,r.obl.em ef.04 eJt. to home. Though le.64 dJta.ma.:ti.c., 
thei.JL choi.c.e .{.4 c.~y ptLa.gmaUc., a.nd a. woJt;t.hy 4ubjec.t 6oll 
thei.JL a.na.ly4~. 
M. H. SONG, MAJ, ROKA; B.S., 1961, Republic of Korea Military 
Academy; candidate for M.S. in Operations Research. 
A. W. SWINGER, LCDR, USN; B.S., 1966, U.S. Naval Academy; 
candidate for M.S. in Operations Research. 
D. R. E. HALE, CAPT, USA; B.S., 1967~ U.S. Military Academy; 
candidate for M.S. in Operations Research. 
T~ papVL Wa.6 .6u.bmUted to PJt.ooe.640lt Thoma.6 601t S:toc.ha&:tlc. 
Model.6 II, OA 4705. 
39 
I. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
A. The System 
1. History of the Naval Postgraduate School Sailing Program 
Sailing at the Naval Postgraduate School began in 1969 on an 
infonna1 basis. _Subsequently, an organized program under the auspices of 
the Recreation Department was established in 1970 by N.P.S. INST. 1710.11. 
From this beginning the activity and interest in sailing has grown until 
today there are over two-hundred people in the program. 
Although the sailing program is financed and directed by the 
Recreation Department, it is, for all practical purposes, managed and operated (J 
by the officers of the Naval Postgraduate School Sailing Association (NPSSA), 
which was established by the 1970 instruction. The NPSSA Conmodore has been 
designated as technical advisor on sailing matters, and renders such advice 
to the Recreation Director. 
2. Objectives of the NPSSA 
The NPSSA is a special-interest group organized and governed by 
a constitution approved by the Superintendent of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
The sailing program includes sailing instruction, recreational sailing and 
competitive sailing. 
The objectives of the association are as follows: 
a. Practice and learn the art of sailing. 
b. Promote good fellowship and sportsmanship. 
c. Learn and promote the rules and etiquette of yacht racing. 
d. Promote competition (racing) between members of the Associa-
tion and with other yacht clubs and sailing associations. o 
e. Procure, maintain and operate sailing craft for the use and 
recreation of members and their guests. 
3. Yacht Inventory and Qualifications Procedure. 
The current NPS yacht inventory consists of four 30-foot Shields 
sloops (one presently permanently chartered to Monterey Peninsula College), 
one 22-foot Santanna 22 sloop, and one 22-foot Columbia 22 sloop. The three 
Sh_ields sloops available for NPS use are racing yachts, but are used a great 
deal for instructional and recreational sailing. The Santanna and the 
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Columbia are used almost exclusively for training and recreational sailing. 
Thus, the inventory consists of two basic categories: Shields (S) and Cruising 
craft (Cr). Due to some basic differences in the handling characteristics 
of these two classes, different levels of qualification are required of those 
entitled to "skipper" and check out each type of boat. The Shields can be 
checked out by skippers holding a class C (race) or 8 (Shields rated) qualifi-
cation. The Cruising class can be checked out by both of the two above ratings 
and by B (Cruising) rated skippers. 
• 4. Reservation Procedure and Skipper Population Statistics 
0 Yachts are reserved on a first-come, first-served sign-up procedure. 
0 
A weekly sign-up sheet is posted in the vicinity of the Recreation Office. 
Boats may not be reserved more than one week in advance, nor for more than one 
of the four sailing periods per day by the same skipper. Daily sailing periods 
are as follows: 0900 - 1100, 1100 - 1400, 1400 - 1700, and 1700 - sunset. 
Certain special racing events and training activities take precedence over 
recreational sailing. 
Once a boat is reserved, the skipper and crew must sign it out 
before sailing and sign in after securing it. The trip is paid for with 
11chits 11 that the skipper attaches to his sign-out sheet . 
The current population of qualified skippers, as detennined from 
the records of the NPSSA, is 91 for Shields and 106 for Cruising boats. These 
figures were obtained from a count of the names that appear on the association 
roster. Unfortunately, the fact that an individual's name is on the roster 
does not guarantee that he or she is an active member in the sense that he or 
she sometimes requests and uses a boat. Since each person on the roster is 
at least a potential customer of the system and because it would be extremely 
difficult and time consuming to attempt to identify the active members, total 
skipper population figures will be used throughout the study. 
B. Objectives of This Study 
1. The primary purpose of this study is to gather information in order 
to answer the following pertinent questions concerning the system: 
a. What type of boat (Shields or Cruiser) should be purchased 
next and what is the appropriate sequence of purchases thereafter? 
b. How would the answer to the above change with system parameter 
changes? 
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2. The additional purpose of this study is to provide a means for 
the study team members to gain experience in conducting a thorough analysis of 
a system. 
C. Measures of Effectiveness 
1. This is potentially one of the most important areas of this study, 
for the measures of effectiveness that are selected will, in turn, determine 
the model to be used and ultimately the answer to the aforementioned questions. 
This arises from the fact that the output of any model will be interpreted in 
terms of the measure of effectiveness selected. Thus, it becomes extremely 
important to define what a measure of effectiveness is. 0 
For this study, we shall consider a measure of effectiveness to be 
11a quantifiable measure of the extent to which system objectives are attained. 11 
It is in this light, then, that the objectives of the system must be analyzed 
to detennine the measures of effectiveness (MOE) which are appropriate. The 
problem then becomes one of how to model the system to obtain values for the 
MOE that are selected and thus answer the questions posed. 
2. An analysis of the specified and implicit objectives of the NPSSA 
led this study team to adopt the following MOE: 
a. The expected percentage of boat periods available that will 
be utilized for Shields and Cruisers. 
b. The expected percentage of boat periods available that the 
maximum number of boats available will be utilized. 
c. The expected number of times (during one week) that a NPSSA 
member desires a boat of a particular type and that particular 
type is not available. 
3. a. The values obtained for MOE 2a. above will be used in deter- O 
mining the answer to the question of the optimal procurement 
policy. The rationale is that the higher the expected utilization 
of a type of boat, the more it is to be preferred as the next 
purchase. 
b. The value obtained for MOE 2b. above will also be used in 
determining the optimal procurement policy. The rationale is that 
the higher the expected maximum usage percentage, the more likely 
it is that this type of boat is preferred by the members and thus 





c. The value of f()E 2c. above will also be used in detennining the 
optimal purchasing policy. The rationale is that the higher the 
expe~ted number of times that a particular type of boat is not 
available to meet a demand, the more desirable that type is for 
the first purchase. 
II. CONSTRUCTING THE MODEL 
A. Counting Process Approach 
A knowledge of the system and consideration of the MOE selected led 
this study team to first consider modeling the system as some form of a 
0 counting process. It was recognized that this approach might provide values 
for the first two MOE discussed and might not provide a value for the last MOE. 
Consequently, it was decided that another model of the GI/D/R fonn (where GI= 
General Input; D = Deterministic Service Times; and R = number of independent 
servers} might provide values for the third MOE selected. 
In the case of the counting process approach, it was detennined that 
it might be necessary to model each type of boat as a different process. 
Intuitively, it seemed that requests or demands of each type of boat would 
differ. This was later substantiated by a thorough examination of the data. 
B. GI/O/R Process Approach 
Although the results which appear for this section may be brief, this 
briefness is inversely proportional to the effort necessary to produce these 
results. In particular, the system was modeled as a M/D/R block system for 
Cruisers and Shields. (Where M = Exponential Interarrival Times; D = Determin-
istic Service Times; and R = number of independent servers. 11Block11 means 
that when the system is full, the arriving customer does not wait.) The results 
O of this particular section can be derived from the examination of the classic 
1918 paper of Erlang. The amount of study and effort of the team to come to 
this conclusion, interpret excerpts from the paper and to derive the results 
was monumental. 
C. The Data 
1. Collection Procedures 
Initially it was necessary to decide whether to model the sign-up 
• procedure or to model the actual usage of boats. In other words, the question 
was whether to extract data from the process of signing up or to extract the 
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data from usage reports. Since a person might sign up and then not actually 
use the boat, it was decided to look only at actual usage reports. These 
reports are known to be accurate due to the fact that 11trip chits 11 described 
in NPS INST. 1710 must be attached, thereby verifying actual use of the boats. 
In support of the third MOE discussed, it was deemed necessary to 
collect data concerning the times when someone desired a boat that was not 
available. Consequently, a special sheet was designed and posted next to the 
sign-up sheet in an effort to obtain this 11balking 11 data. The results of this 
attempt were negative in the respect that no "balks" were indicated during a 
period of 2 months. () 
The choice of looking at actual usage data is not equivalent to 
observing the process at random points in time. Specifically, use of the 
actual usuage data provided observations only for those times which were the 
beginning of service or boat availability times. 
2. Data Analysis 
In attempting to get an intuitive feeling for the counting process, 
scatter plots of the arrivals of the Shields and Cruisers were constructed. 
The first plot constructed reflected arrivals of both types of boats and then 
a plot for each individual type of boat was constructed. Each of these plots 
generated infonnation which was extremely valuable in the determination of the 
fonn of the arrival process. 
From the scatter plots of each boat, the interarrival times were 
extracted. The results of this extraction provided the first lesson (insigni-
ficant or naive as it might seem) for this study team. The plot of the inter-
arrival times for each process was unbelievably exponential. Initially, the 
reaction of the study team was great enthusiasm, but closer investigation O 
revealed the following fault. Although the data would pass the Chi Square 
and K - S test for the hypothesis of an exponential distribution, it was 
obvious that many of the longer interarrival times occurred at the beginning 
of the week and many of the shorter interarr ival times occurred toward the 
end of the week • . In other words, the observations of the interarrival times 
appeared to lack time independence when considering the entire week. The 
hY.pothesis of time independence was tested using the "runs test" and the result 





With guarded enthusiasm, we began to consider the possibility of 
a nonhomogeneous process for each type of boat. Thus, we began to look at 
the scatter plots for segments of time wherein the arrival process might have 
the necessary qualities of a Poisson process. After conducting many unsuccess-
ful tests of different time segments, we finally found 3 time segments for the 
Shields process and 2 segments for the Cruiser process. In each of these seg-
ments the Maximum Likelihood Estimator for A was computed and a test of the 
hypothesis of an exponential distribution was successful. Additionally, the 
results of the runs test indicated time independence of the observations of 
the interarrival times within a particular segment. Finally, the coefficient 
of variation for each time segment was computed and it compared favorably to 
the desired value of 1. 
Returning to the scatter plots for both boats, it was obvious 
that for each arrival from which interarrival times had been extracted there 
was the possibility of the arrival consisting of 1, 2, or 3 boat demands for 
Shields and l or 2 boat demands for Cruisers. In other words, not only was 
the process for each boat type nonhomogeneous, it was also compound. Letting 
X be defined as the random variable representing the number of boats demanded 
at the occurrence of an arrival, we began to consider the following questions: 
a. What is the distribution of X for each type boat? 
b. Is the distribution of X the same throughout the entire 
week - are the observed values of X independent of the time 
period? 
c. If the answer to b. is negative, then what is the distribution 
of Xi where Xi is defined as the random variable X during time 
segment i. 
d. Are the observed values of X; time independent within the 
particular segment i? 
Generally, if one considers a compound process to be such that each 
arrival is classified upon arrival, we were trying to establish the independence 
of this classification procedure from the arrival process. In our case, the 
independence of X was not present. Intuitively, this seemed correct, for it 
would appear that the form of boat demands would be much different on a weekend 
than during the beginning of the week. 
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As previously outlined, we next investigated the distribution 
of the number of demands within each time segment that had a homogeneous 
arrival process. In each case the distribution of the Xi was hypothesized 
and tested against the observed values using the Chi Square test. Then the 
time independence of data within a particular segment was tested using the 
runs test. In each segment, the distribution of X; was found to be independent 
of the time of the arrival. Our conclusion was that the appropriate counting 
process model was of the fonn: 
SHIELDS 
Y(t) = Y1(t) + Y2(t) + Y3(t) 
N1(t) N2 (t) N3(t) 
= li=l xil + li=l xi2 + li=l X;3 
where Ni(t) ~ P(Ait) 
CRUISERS 
Y(t) = v1(t) + Y2(t) 
N1(t) N2{t) 
= li=l xil + li=l xi2 
where Ni(t) ~ P(Ait) 
Implicit in this model (referred to as the utilization model) is 
the assumption that the process for each time segment is independent of the 
process of another time segment. 
() 
By transforming the Xi's of the utilization model into Mi1 s, an 
indicator function of max usage, a model (referred to as the max usage model) 0 
was developed. All tests conducted for the utilization model are applicable 
to the max usage model. It is important to note that the form of this model 
is also nonhomogeneous and since Mi= 1 or 0, the process is Poisson. 
Finally, the results of the analysis of the data indicated the 
use of the following specific form of a GI/D/R model: 
SHIELDS M/D/3 
where interarrival times ~Exp(Ai) for each segment i 








where interarrival times ~Exp(Ai) for each segment i 
and service time= constant= 1 unit. 
III. DERIVING A SOLUTION 
A. General 
1. Utilization Model 
After a thorough analysis of the data to construct the model, the 
derivation of a solution was relatively easy. The technique of Laplace trans-
formation was relied upon to allow the derivation of the generating function of 
the number of boat periods utilized, then the expected number of boat periods 
utilized was computed. This value was next used to determine the value of the 
MOE associated with percentage of utilization, then a comparison was made 
between the value of the MOE for each type of boat to determine the type of 
boat that should be purchased first. Under the assumption that no other changes 
in the system occur when another boat is purchased, it was possible to deter-
mine that the desired procurement sequence was Cruiser, Shields, Shields, Cruiser. 
It is important to observe that this sequence is based upon the MOE of percentage 
utilization only and does not consider the value of the other MOE. 
In determining an answer to the second question of how the system 
changes with changes in the system parameters, a graphical technique was applied. 
For each type of boat a plot or graph of EY(t) as a function Ai was constructed. 
Use of these graphs allows the prediction of values of EY(t) (and thus the MOE) 
for all values of Ai. Obviously, this prediction assumes all other parameters 
remaining constant while only one parameter is varied. 
2. Max Usage Model 
The value of the MOE of percentage of max utilization was derived 
in a manner very similar to that used for the utilization model. Comparison 
of the value of this MOE for each boat provided an answer to the question of 
which type of boat to purchase first. However, prediction of an optimal 
sequence was beyond the capabilities of this model. This is due to the inability 
to change the Mi·distribution when another boat of either type is purchased. 
In other words, it was not possible to predict how often an additional boat 
would be used. 
Again, a graphical representation of how EY(t) changes with Ai 
provides insights as to how the value of the MOE would change as the system 
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parameter Ai is changed. As before, this prediction assumes all other 
factors remaining constant . 
3. M/D/R Model 
Evaluation of the MOE suited to this model-allows a comparison 
between Shields and Cruiser nonavailability. This comparison provides an 
answer to t he question of which type of boat should be purchased first. 
Additionally, making severa l iterations, with the number of boats that are in 
the system increasing by one with each iteration, allows the determination of 
the optimal procurement sequence. In this specific case, the expected number 
of bl ocks (nonavailabilities) was so low that the determination of the sequence 
was terminated after one iteration. 
The question of how the value of the MOE changes as system par-
ameters change could best be attacked through use of a computer to evaluate 
PR for many values of Ai. Because of the time necessary to accomplish such 
a task, this was not done during this study. An attempt to trace the change 




















Crui ser, Shields, Shields, Cruiser 
N/A 
Cruiser, Shi elds 
for which first purchase choice changes 
A1s.305, A2~.329, 31.5~52A1+36A2 
Als.269, AzS. 217, . 98~2Al+A2 
Not computed 
In terms of all MOE and all models, the first purchase should be a 
Cruiser. 
IV. VALIDATION 
A. Calculation Verification 
All calculations were done at least twice; the second time being a 








8. Comparison of Model to Data 
Extensive calculations were conducted with both the model and the 
data in order to prepare a comparison of the system values as the model 
dictates and the system values as the data prescribes. Where appropriate, 
the following system values were compared: EY(t), VarY(t), EXi or EMi, 
VarXi or VarMi, ENi(t), VarNi(t) and the coefficient of variation. For 
each submodel of a particular time segment, these values compared quite 
favorably. In those cases where noticeable differences existed, the values 
were within the range of one standard deviation of the base value. 
C. Other Validation 
In addition to the fonnal measures previously mentioned, a careful 
examination of the model was conducted to determine if there were any pre-
dicted results that defied the intuition of the team members concerning the 
form of the actual process. No such faults were observed; in fact, the 
confidence we placed in the models was increased after making the comparison. 
For example (trivial), the model predicts higher utilization on the weekends 
than during the first part of the week. There are many other such intuitive 
checks that were conducted and satisfied. 
V. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A. General 
The intent of the sensitivity analysis that was conducted during this 
study was to examine what change in the parameters of the model would be 
sufficient to change the results. To do this, it was necessary to investigate 
the change in the values of the MOE and to detem1ine at what point a different 
value of the MOE would dictate a change in the procurement policy. 
8. Method 
0 In the case of the utilization model and the max usage model, the 
approach was to determine the rate of change of EY(t) with respect to each 
Ai while all other parameters were held constant. By determining this rate 
it was possible to know how much change in Ai was necessary to change EY{t) 
sufficiently to alter the procurement policy. In each case the solution to 
this problem was left in a form that allows determination of a change in 
policy by mere inspection. Finally, the same problem was solved when consid-
ering a change in two A1
1 s at the same time. 
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C. Other Considerations 
Another aspect of the models which has not been previously discussed 
is the assumption of an infinite populati on. This assumption manifests 
itself in the nature of the arrival process. In particular, an infinite 
population guarantees that when several members are in the system, the non-
presence of these members in the out-of-system population does not affect or 
change the arriva l rate . In the case at hand the question becomes whether 3 
members out of a total popul ation of approximately 200 can influence the 
arrival rate. We believe not. Furthennore, even if t here is an influence, 
• 
• 
we believe this influence to be one which certainly would not change the values 0 
of the MOE that were obtained. This observation results from examination of 
the required change in the arrival rate parameters that was derived during 
the previous part of sensitivity analysis . 
Our study t eam did not investigate the sensitivity of the results of 
the models to changes in the other system parameter, EX; or EM1• The reason 
for this is two-fold -- f i rst, it is our opinion that changes in the other 
parameter, A;, were more l ikely (possibly from population changes) and, second, 
the change of EY(t) wi th respect to EX; would be difficult mathematically, 
for the compound process used in the utilization model. Had more time been 
available, a careful analysis of the effect of EX; and EM; would have been 
conducted. 




3. School Schedule (exams and vacation periods} 
4. Maintenance of Boats. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL 
A. G~eral 
The NPS Recreation Department Director and the Commodore of the 
NPSSA are both aware that this study is being conducted and are anticipating 
its results. Needless to say, these people are not only concerned with a 
procurement policy, but also with the cost implications of procurement. Such 





of our study group to forward a sunvnary of the results and recommendation of 
our efforts, in layman's terms, to the Recreation Director. The usage data 
will be explained, as well as the resultant procurement policy. 
B. Plan 
Under ideal circumstances, the implementation plan would also have 
to sufficiently explain the effect of population changes on arrival rate and 
the distribution of the Xi's. Additionally, since the people who need to use 
this study are not trained in the techniques that were applied, indicators of 
changes in arrival rates, Xi's, and possible balking would have to be devised 
0 and explained. Given these, a method for relating them to changes in procure-
ment policy would be the next step. Our work concerning prediction and sensi-
tivity analysis of the model is somewhat amenable to these requirements. 
However, it is our opinion that close examination of future data at regular 
intervals would best be accomplished under the supervision of someone qualified 
in the techniques of the study. Thus, our study group views the implementation 
plan as a continual effort requiring close coordination between the user (the 
Recreation Department) and the analysts. 
0 
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